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Section II of “The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms” is an attempt by the author, Charles Leslie Stevenson, to explain what an emotive meaning is, with respect to ethical terms. My objective is to give a clear translation of what Stevenson says in section II, in order to provide a better understanding of Stevenson’s interest theory.
Stevenson begins this section by reiterating the fact that he believes that there is some one sense of the word “good” which satisfies all three of his requirements (mentioned in section I) with which the “vital” sense of “good” is expected to comply: (1) goodness must be a topic for intelligent disagreement, (2) it must be “magnetic”, and (3) it must not be discoverable solely through the scientific method (p.18). Stevenson begins to defend his argument by acknowledging the three failed approaches ethicists have taken in attempting to explain the term: (1) as a Platonic Idea, (2) a Categorical Imperative, and (3) of a unique, un-ana...