How convincing is the view that when we are talking about morality we are talking about facts?

Ethical language is something that has been debated for many years and has been discussed as both non-cognitive and cognitive. The cognitive view, that when we are talking about morality we are talking about facts, is one that is often put to question as it is a difficult belief to accept. For example, how can we be as certain about goodness, truth or justice, as we are about say the colour of a wall? Where does this knowledge come from?

The non-cognitive view, that moral statements are not propositions available to knowledge, is, in my opinion easier to believe. This is based firstly on the difficulty many people have with simply accepting that the truth or falsity of a moral statement is through pre-conceived knowledge. This idea is similar to Plato’s theory of forms. The theory that we are born with an acknowledgement of a perfect form, ‘goodness’.

It is possible to consider moral statements are actually factual, however, justifying our understanding simply by sugges...