Critique of Carnap’s article on the Confirmation of Laws and Theories.

Introduction

After presenting an outline of Carnap’s article, I want to proceed to critique his position. Firstly, I will offer a critique of Carnap’s proposition that „science begins with direct observations of single facts“. Secondly, I will try to point out the peculiarities and contradictions, that Carnap will necessarily have to fall into by taking on a logical positivistic and empiricist position. Thirdly, I will try to point out the weaknesses of induction and the impossibility of arriving at „theoretical laws“ as well as the principle of induction using only the method of induction. At last, I will discuss Carnap’s understanding of probability and weather or not his use of it is justified. As a critique I will use Edith Steins „Einführung in die Philosophie“, especially in showing that the observation of single facts, cannot be the starting point in science. Fritz Wenisch’s „Untersuchung zum Methodenproblem in der Philosophie“ will be useful in ...